The Chinese rushed to reinforce their troops at Aksai Chin in front of the XIV Corps of India. Some of these additional forces had come before as part of the previously planned push to secure Indian territory. Reservations have been induced to counter the Indian deployment intended to launch offensive operations. What did the Chinese have in the area for border management before launching Operation Land-Grab and what have they added? According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, prior to the start of the confrontation, the People’s Liberation Army (EPL) had three border defense companies based near the areas in question in Aksai Chin. Two were drawn from the 362nd Border Defense Regiment, one located at the 19th-century Khurnak Fort on the north bank of the Pangong Tso and the other at the Spanggur Tso to the south. The third is located in Kongka La Pass, near the Indian post in Gogra / Hot Springs, and belongs to the 363rd Border Defense Regiment. All of these subunits patrolled the LAC that ran into Indian patrols and was used to make the initial intrusions. The Border Defense Regiments are on par with regular troops as a team, (except in armored combat vehicles), communications, and leadership. Its counterpart is the Indo-Tibetan border police that occupies posts throughout LAC and is backed by army infantry battalions that patrol the border in rotation from nearby camps.
There is also a Chinese squad of patrollers at Pangong Lake. All of these subunits taken together would equal about 500 to 600 people. In reaction to the changed situation, additional troops were drawn from one or both of their parents’ Border Defense Regiments operational reserves are also likely to have been deployed to the area, bringing the total number of EPL border forces in the area to 1,000 -1,500 employees.
Border troops have been reinforced by mobilizing more combat forces, most likely from the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division, a northern or high-altitude maneuver formation. This formation is normally based at a distance from the Aksai
Chin on the southern edge of the Taklamakan desert. It is the main operating reserve of the Xinjiang Southern Military District and is destined to be the first to respond to any operational crisis in the region. This deployment replicates that of the 2017 Doklam crisis, where border-management troops ran the front line with regiments of regularly-trained maneuvers retained further back as an attack reserve.
By the end of May, main battle tank units and towed artillery batteries had been deployed at existing Chinese positions north and east of Gogra. This combination of heavy armor and towed artillery is now quite rare in the EPL after the latest military reforms. Normally armored combat vehicles would be supported by self-propelled artillery. What is known about the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division is that it has yet to receive self-propelled artillery. This is also true for the other three mechanized divisions in the Xinjiang Military District.
A map of the region
In Pangong Tso and the finger area, the Chinese have now stationed heavily at Finger 8. On May 18 and 19, the PLA had brought about 2,500 soldiers to the subsector. These were regular personnel rather than personnel from the Border Defense Regiment. This was done very visibly, the obvious intention was to outnumber the relatively smaller Indian contingent facing them on the lakeshore. They have established a logistics center in conjunction with the deployment of armored combat vehicles. Larger boats have been brought in to dominate the bodies of water and transport storm troops through them. The Chinese-built road from Finger 8 to Finger 5 by the lake also helps them in the rapid transfer of troops from there to the base of Finger 4. There is a considerable accumulation of Chinese. This has resulted in shorter reaction time and the time required for the movement of troops.
In the Galwan River Valley, a Chinese infantry platoon deployed at Patrol Point 14 (PP14) had been withdrawn in the fourth week of May. The main PLA camp was established three kilometers further back in territory already occupied by them. We do not know at this time if this unit is compatible with armor or artillery. Such a fire maneuver or support seems unlikely in the absence of viable communications. This has been planned for some time but remains unfinished. Further strengthening of the sector seems unfeasible at this time.
What is known is that China has now accumulated strength levels throughout LAC to include another mechanized infantry division trained and equipped for high-altitude warfare. What could this be? My view is that the 8th or 11th Motorized Infantry Divisions, part of the three mechanized formations of the Xinjiang Military District that are in reserve some distance from the Aksai Chin, have already been deployed.
Indian Humint, Comment and Techint are closely observing the activities, readiness and operational readiness of another 10,000-12,000 Chinese troops deployed in Xinjiang with high-mobility vehicles (Chinese copies of Humvees) and weapons in rear positions with the ability to reach LAC or deep positions ready to launch offensives or in a counter-penetration role within two days. This could be the 4th Motorized Infantry Division stationed at Aksu. His induction into the theater could tip the balance in favor of the PLA.
The Chinese normally have two mountain warfare trained and equipped divisions deployed in the Tibet region. Generally, reliable sources claim that, in reaction to the current crisis and the accumulation of Indians, they have brought close to two additional divisions from places as far as 2,000 kilometers from mainland China as a countermeasure. This is outside the Aksai Chin region.
The Chinese have a formidable number of troops in Aksai Chin with armored artillery, air defense, drones, helicopters, air support, and mechanized infantry. The Western Theater regional command, which directs all troops that are raised and oversee operations against India, has several reserves awaiting deployment.
Deployment of air power against the Chinese
Several mistakes were made in conducting the 1962 war. By far the major was not using our formidable but formidable air force for offensive air operations. Our Canberras, Hunters, Mysteries, Gnats, Ouragans (Toofanis), and Vampires flown by well-trained and motivated pilots would have intercepted Chinese communication lines, bombed, bombarded, and fired their artillery batteries, troop concentrations, headquarters, supply columns. and even front elements. Although combat air patrols and reconnaissance flights were flown by the IAF, they were prohibited from firing even a single round. Air Marshal MM Singh, then a Squad Leader commanding Squad 24 (Hawks) saw a strong enemy column moving towards one of our defended locations in the Walong sector while flying a reconnaissance mission on their Vampire fighter. He dove in and had the satisfaction of seeing them scatter in panic even though he couldn’t fire a single shot. It was irritating for a professional fighter pilot to be trapped like this while the ground troops fought for their lives.
IAF helicopters played an important role in reconnaissance, evacuation of victims, provision of cutting posts, and communications. Squad leader Vinod Sehgal volunteered to fly his Bell helicopter to Namka Chu and discover what the situation was on the ground after communications with the formation under attack were lost by division headquarters on the first day of the war. Not knowing that the Chinese were already targeting the heliport, he tried to land and was shot down, and killed as he got out of the machine and took refuge. Here a pair of helicopters equipped with machine guns and bombs dropped on the advancing enemy troops would have caused wear and tear on the affected Indian defenders. But sadly the aggressive spirit so essential to such improvisations was lacking. The government unreasonably concerned about Chinese retaliation against civilian targets had curbed the IAF’s fighting spirit.
Indian army trucks leave for Ladakh amid a clash between Indian and Chinese troops in eastern Ladakh, on the Manali-Leh highway in the Kullu district. (PTI Photo)
The transport plane played a major role in 1962. From moving troops to remote destinations to providing positions that relied solely on on-air launch to strategic air transport, the IAF was everywhere. AN-12s operating from Chandigarh transported AMX-13 tanks to Chushul, which had a significant impact on operations in and around the airbase. It was a masterful exercise in improvisation and aviation. Greetings to the transport fleet!
While the PLAAF (Chinese Air Force) has not reported any air intrusions, the IAF is on high alert. Combat air patrols are in full swing, including night outings. Frontline air superiority fighters like the Su-30 MKI. Mig-29s. Mirage 2000s and Jaguars have been relocated to operational bases in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and Haryana. The bases in Avantipura, Pathankot, Adampur, Chandigarh, Halwara, Ambala, etc. they are on high alert.
Apache helicopters armed with Hellfire missiles are ready to face Chinese armor and mechanized infantry. Not surprisingly, the plane is known as a super tank killer. Chinook heavy-duty helicopters have been deployed for tactical troop movements, casevac, and supply functions. Significantly, the Chinook can transport the M-777 155mm Ultralight Medium Howitzer without hanging. This will greatly increase the hit and mobility of attack formations.
Strategic air transport is the stronghold of the IAF. Using C-17 Globemasters and C-130J Super Hercules transport planes, tens of thousands of battle-ready troops have flown to Ladakh along with weapons and equipment. Illyushin IL-76 has made shorter flights with lower loads. A large part of the burden of logistically keeping the additional accused troops in the theater with food, ammunition, medicine, tentage, housing, and other supplies during the winter will fall on the transport squads.
Rapid reaction ground-to-air missiles (SAMs) deployed by both the IAF and the Army have been positioned at strategic points to conduct air defense of facilities, dumps for supplies and ammunition, command and control centers, and concentrations of troops and armor. Defend Indian airspace in a nutshell. Medium range mobile Akash missiles are included in these. These have been modified for deployment and use at high altitudes.
Eastern Ladakh Sitrep: July 9, 2020
The Prime Minister’s visit raised the morale of the Ladakh armed forces and citizens. The visit and the public stance indicated the temporary failure of military-level talks aimed at downscaling and the withdrawal of forces. The rhetoric and harsh intentions displayed had their effect. The talks at the Special Representative level appear to have resolved the issues to some extent. There are reports, albeit carefully worded, and kept in the nature of the withdrawals of Chinese troops and the corresponding Indian separations.
All for the good. Things could be improving. What should we consider in the future? We could be showing an undue urgency for downscaling. The Chinese have claimed the entire Galwan Valley and the dominant heights. Their behavior and movements even after a backward movement would have to be watched very carefully. Very defined and precise recognition and surveillance systems must be established in addition to the use of human resources. Mark I eyeballs on an Indian skull alone won’t be enough! Anything out of the ordinary will be suspicious. In this sector, the Chinese only have access to a dirt road to move troops, vehicles, and supplies. Macadamising, that is to say, the black covering of this road will indicate without a doubt that the Chinese are repudiating any agreement made with us. This is the reality of today.
The People’s Republic of China, as a matter of national policy, uses force and negotiation at the same time. We must be prepared not only to play the same game with them but also to beat them. New professionalism, new cruelty must take root. Desiring to occupy moral ground forever is fleeting. We must learn the correct lessons and modify our strategic imperatives. While the Chinese give preference to the big picture, our thinking is the exact opposite: tactical in nature.
Finally, the reserve formations that moved to eastern Ladakh will have to stay there in the meantime, at least during the winter. Such is the fickle nature of agreements with the Chinese! This will add enormously to our logistical burden and administrative burden. We must be prepared for that. It must be remembered that in foreign policy as in war there are no prizes for runners-up.
She is a freelance blogger, writer, and speaker, and writes for various entertainment magazines.