However, the Army says it carried out a troop build-up throughout the crisis in LAC in response to Chinese actions, essentially a “breach of confidence” by the PLA that diverted troops from a training exercise. to the confrontation sites on the border.
The first reports of a sighting of the PLA troop movement on the Chinese side of the Current Control Line came in mid-April, almost two weeks before Chinese and Indian soldiers struck the north bank of Pangong Tso from 5-6. of May. But the Army says these reports never came, and the first reports it received in May only mentioned infrastructure construction activity.
An intelligence official told The Indian Express that the more specific entries came within days of the first reports in mid-April. The entrances were sightings of hundreds of Chinese heavy military vehicles, moving north from areas opposite Demchok.
These reports have strengthened the view at the highest levels of the intelligence setup that important details, while available, were overlooked as the crisis spread in Ladakh, leaving the government in a blind spot.
However, the Army says it carried out a troop build-up throughout the crisis in LAC in response to Chinese actions, essentially a “breach of confidence” by the PLA that diverted troops from a training exercise. to the confrontation sites on the border.
The sudden movement of a massive number of Chinese troops along the Ladakh border and the multiple entries through LAC have led to a debate about the initial response to the crisis: whether it had more to do with the inability to read the Chinese actions on available information o It was due to systemic changes in the way stakeholders share intelligence after the dissolution of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) two years ago.
The intelligence official referred to the statement by Army Chief General MM Naravane on May 15 that clashes between Chinese and Indian troops across LAC in eastern Ladakh and Sikkim were “routine” and they are not part of a “bigger plan”.
The first confrontation in Pangong Tso was on the night of May 5/6 in which Indian and Chinese troops were wounded. Another clash took place at Naku La in Sikkim on May 9.
“Clashes occur periodically with PLA. This happens due to differences in the perception of how LAC works. These clashes have happened in the past. That is what has happened now. It is just a fluke that the clashes occurred at the same time in eastern Ladakh and Sikkim. We shouldn’t read too much on it. It is not part of any stand nor are these two interconnected confrontations. These confrontations are also not related to any national or international situation, “General Naravane said at an MPIDSA seminar.
The official said the Army’s first acknowledgment of the seriousness of the situation was only after May 17/18, when Chinese troops had moved to Foxhole Point, the southernmost tip of the north bank on Finger 4, and in Green Tops on the ridge. in the Pangong area. This was followed by the first high-powered China Study Group meeting on May 18, where the situation on the Ladakh border was discussed.
A senior Army officer said, “there were no reports of any massive movement of PLA troops and deployment with us in April.” The first report on the movement of some Chinese military vehicles was received only in May, related to infrastructure construction activities. ”
The officer said that “the Chinese troops, which were part of a continuous training exercise, were then diverted to the fighting sites in LAC. These exercises are routine every summer and the two armies have long been known to return to their bases after exercise. It is an established standard, scrupulously followed for years. ”
“This year again, we were aware of these exercises by the PLA in the exercise area, but there was a breach of confidence and faith on the part of the Chinese, as they diverted these troops to the sites of confrontation. The distance from the exercise area to these sites is about 200 km, and it does not take long to do so. It was a breach of trust, ”said the officer.
The Army used to bring brigades from its reserve division in Ladakh for training exercises every summer, but this year it was shelved due to the national closure following the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.
While Leh-based division troops and independent infantry and armored brigades moved quickly to respond to Chinese inputs, additional troops were subsequently transported to the area in the second half of May.
“Ab initio, we had adequate reserves in eastern Ladakh and carried out the accumulation of troops according to operational requirements. In addition to the sites of confrontation, the accumulation of Chinese troops throughout LAC also occurred in late May and early June, which was again matched by us, “said the officer.
A second intelligence official said the question is not about an intelligence input from the massive PLA troop movement in Tibet, but about the analysis and evaluation of that input where “hostile intent” can be detected. The official, who has been part of the intelligence setup for more than three decades, said, “This was reminiscent of the Kargil raids in 1999, where the ticket analysis mechanism had failed.”
It is after the abolition of JIC in 2018, as part of the reform of the structure of the secretariat of the national security council, said the official, that the process for joint evaluation and exchange of information at the forefront between various parties. Stakeholders have changed.
In 2018, the central JIC institution was replaced by the office of the Deputy National Security Adviser for internal security, along with two other Deputy NSAs and a military adviser. The intelligence input review meeting, which has replaced the JIC meeting, is now chaired by the three rotating Deputy NSAs.
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